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Abstract
P2P systems constitute nowadays an increasingly impor-
tant part of the online world that needs or will soon need
all kinds of e-commerce services and applications that are
normally available today on client-server platforms. When
designing new e-commerce solutions in P2P particular at-
tention must be paid to masking autonomy of the peers and
the lack of any central authorities as two most important
problems. In this paper we explore possibilities to bring e-
commerce into P2P and propose a double auctioning mech-
anism that does not rely on the existence of central author-
ities, auctioneer in particular, and is amenable to imple-
mentation in P2P environments. The mechanism has good
economic properties such as, for example, fast convergence
towards efﬁcient trading through intuitive and simple bid-
ding strategies.
1. Introduction
In spite of the effort that recording industries are making
to protect their copyrights and disable MP3 songs distribu-
tion in P2P networks, P2P is here to stay. On the one hand,
the client-server architecture, currently prevalent architec-
tural solution, is being pushed very close towards its lim-
its with respect to bandwidth consumption and scalability
problems. On the other hand, network communities show
nowadays a strong desire for autonomy and independence
of any authorities and this idea will not be easily abandoned
in the future. These are in our opinion two most important
driving forces that bring us to the conclusion that P2P is not
just a technological innovation of the day. The fact that al-
most $1 bln has been invested in P2P companies in the last
two years goes well in line with this statement.
At present, P2P systems are mainly used in simple
(mostly music) ﬁle sharing scenarios. But, the time when
the potential of the P2P architecture, including distributed
computing and P2P e-commerce for instance, will be fully
exploited is not far away. This paper presents our attempt
to bring e-commerce on P2P platforms. In particular, possi-
bilities for making double auctioning markets on top of P2P
are explored. We identify some desirable properties that a
P2P-suitable double auctioning mechanism should have as
well as possible problems related to a straightforward P2P
implementation of the Continuous Double Auction (CDA).
Based on the developed ideas we propose a new trading
mechanism that is easily “P2P-able”. We also check its eco-
nomic characteristics and show that a simple reasoning is
sufﬁcient to enable economic agents to quickly discover the
equilibrium price and the way towards efﬁcient trading.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates
the need for P2P computing and presents a short overview
of the technology. Section 3 identiﬁes the main problems
that a P2P marketplace design would normally imply and
motivates the way we proceed. In Section 4 we review
main results of the double auction theory. Special attention
is paid to the CDA as our trading is essentially an adapta-
tion of the CDA to P2P environments. Section 5 deﬁnes
our trading mechanism while empirical results related to its
economic properties are presented in Section 6. Section 7
concludes the paper and outlines the future work.
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2. P2P: a technology overview
Peer-to-peer computing is certainly not a new idea. The
Internet itself started as a P2P system. Originating in an aca-
demic environment with a relatively small number of users,
in which cooperation was a goal and a value, it was easy
for such a network to meet the needs of its users. But,
the subsequent commercialization of the Internet as well
as the availability of inexpensive high performance com-
puting equipment brought an easy opportunity for literally
everyone around the Globe to come online. Thus, under
these new circumstances, new architectural solutions were
needed to meet growing business (e-commerce) needs and
circumvent serious security hazards. The World Wide Web
and client-server architecture perfectly met such needs. It
became easy for a company to set up a web site and provide
various services to its clients. eBay, currently the largest
auctioning site world wide, is a good example. What eBay
does is essentially providing an online marketplace (in the
form of a web service) in which its 49.7 million (the ﬁg-
ure was announced on eBay’s web site) registered users can
compete in an auction-like manner to buy or sell the most
diverse goods. But, when playing with so large numbers
the client-server architecture has certain serious limitations
- resources are concentrated on a small number of nodes
and network bandwidth becomes a nightmare under such
circumstances. As well, providing continuous and reliable
access becomes a serious problem. These reasons, among
many others, are bringing the idea of P2P computing alive
again.
Peer-to-peer computing is most commonly deﬁned as
sharing of computer resources (disk storage, processing
power, exchange of information, etc.) by direct commu-
nication between computing systems. Thus, it takes advan-
tage of already existing computing resources allowing the
whole group of computers to more effectively make use of
their collective power. Every participating node in a P2P
system can act as both a client and a server (and at the same
time).
The most important design requirements for a P2P en-
vironment can be split into the following two confronted
groups. On the one hand, the system must be decentral-
ized in the sense that there must be no central authority that
would present a single point of failure and that the global
behaviour of the system should emerge from local interac-
tions among the peers only. On the other hand, there is the
requirement for high performances of the system in terms of
low search latency, message bandwidth and storage costs.
Most of currently available P2P solutions (Gnutella [1],
CHORD [12], P-Grid [2], just to mention a few) fulﬁll these
requirements to a high degree. Though this degree varies
from system to system, the main difference among P2P sys-
tems is in the way this is achieved. P-Grid, for example,
builds a distributed binary search tree on the hashed con-
tent ﬁles. By means of an appropriate randomized algo-
rithm, the tree is built only from local interactions among
the peers. In any case, the result is highly efﬁcient, loga-
rithmic search. Robustness of the tree against peer or net-
work failures is achieved by a suitable replication of the tree
structure. On the other hand, Gnutella operates without any
auxiliary indexing structure. A search request is ﬂooded
through the network until a peer having the ﬁle searched
for replies back. It was shown that Gnutella networks have
small-world properties, which keeps search latency at low
levels.
3. P2P and markets: common problems
The lack of central trusted authorities and the autonomy
of the peers present the two major obstacles one faces when
designing double auctioning markets in P2P. Let us describe
this assertion in more detail.
Namely, when designing a market in general its de-
signer’s primary goals are that:
1. the market is efﬁcient (in the sense that no further gains
from the trades are possible) and that
2. the economic agents are really willing to participate
in the market (in the sense that there is enough trust
that they will fulﬁl their promised actions and that the
quality of their services will be as claimed).
To achieve the ﬁrst goal the trading rules of the mecha-
nism must be set in a proper way (we touch this problem in
the next section). As for the second one, branding, formal
contracting or litigation are established ways for achieving
it. But, in a P2P environment, neither of these two goals
can be achieved by straightforwardly applying the already
established solutions.
With respect to the ﬁrst goal, the problem we face is that
all known double auctioning mechanisms base their proper
functioning (efﬁciency in particular) on, at least, some form
of centralization. As decentralization is an important de-
sign requirement for a P2P environment it is clear that a
P2P-suitable trading mechanism must be free of any central
components. A new mechanism that fulﬁls this requirement
will be described throughout the rest of the paper.
As far as the second goal is concerned, the problem we
face stems from the expectation that most of the transac-
tions in a P2P environment might be at small stakes so that
the mentioned assurance mechanisms are simply inefﬁcient.
To this end, we are assuming existence of social ways to
achieve this goal such as trust and reputation management
mechanisms. A number of decentralized reputation man-
agement schemes, appropriate for P2P networks, arrived in
recent years ([3] and [15] for instance). Their functioning
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and related details are out of the scope of this paper. The
exact inﬂuence of these works on the resulting market will
be studied in the future.
4. Double auction theory overview
In this section we review main results of the double auc-
tion theory. It is not our intention here to give a compre-
hensive overview. Rather, the description that follows is
tailored to suit the understanding of the rest of the paper.
Particular attention is devoted to the continuous double auc-
tion as this trading mechanism bears some similarity to our
approach.
An auction is usually deﬁned as a market institution with
an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and
prices on the basis of bids from the market participants [8].
In one-sided auctions there is one seller and many buyers
willing to buy the auctioned item (the case of one buyer
and many sellers is technically fully equivalent to this case),
while in double-sided auctions there are many buyers and
many sellers submitting bids simultaneously. The (double)
auctioning problem has two sides. From the perspective of
the auction participants, the problem is how to bid optimally
and extract as much gain from the trade as possible given
the valuation of the good the participant is about to trade
and her knowledge of the trading rules as well as her be-
liefs about the valuations of the other participants. From
the point of view of the auction designer, the problem is
to design the auction rules in such a way that buyers (sell-
ers) who value the goods the most (least) receive the goods
(money) in the end so that no further gains from the trade are
possible. The trading mechanism efﬁciency, deﬁned as the
sum of the gains of the auction participants who trade ac-
cording to the rules and submitted bids, relates to this idea
in an obvious way.
In a double auction, because the bidders’ strategic be-
haviour must be modelled on both sides of the market,
game-theoretic analysis of the double auction problem be-
comes substantially harder and analytic results are not so
numerous as in the case of one-sided auctions. (A notable
exception is Myerson-Satthertwaite impossibility result [9]
claiming that the only way to get truthful bidding as the
optimal strategy in a fully efﬁcient and individually ratio-
nal trading mechanism is to provide outside subsidies.) The
rules governing the clearing policy of the market as well
as the determination of the (pairs of) traders among buy-
ers and sellers as well as the transaction price(s) play the
most important role in double auctions classiﬁcation. With
respect to how frequently the auction market is cleared a
distinction is made between continuous auctions (the con-
tinuous double auction, CDA, being the most widespread
representative), that match buyers and sellers and clear the
market immediately upon arrival of compatible bids, and
synchronous variants (often referred to as call markets),
that collect bids over a prespeciﬁed time interval and clear
the market only once upon the expiration of this interval.
The transaction prices determination policy makes a further
distinction among double auction types by grouping them
into uniform-price auctions, in which all traders trade at the
same price, and multiple-price auctions, in which different
pairs of traders trade at different prices.
[10] provides an analysis of a call market modelled as
k-double auction. In a k-double auction (k ∈ [0, 1]) bid-
ders submit sealed bids, then the trading price is computed
and the market is cleared. The trading price is computed in
the following way: denote by M and N numbers of buy-
ers and sellers and a and b the M -th and (M + 1)-st lowest
bid (among both buy and sell bids). Then the price is deter-
mined as p = ka+(1− k)b. If m and n denote the number
of buy offers above the price and the number of sell offers
below it, then, for c = min(m,n), the set of traders con-
sists of c highest buy offers and c lowest sell offers.1 For
k = 0 this mechanism is incentive compatible for sellers,
while for k = 1 it is incentive compatible for buyers ([14]).
But, for any k ∈ (0, 1) is not incentive compatible neither
for buyers nor for sellers. Therefore, in this case truthful
bidding is not an equilibrium but, as shown in [10], when
numbers of buyers and sellers, M and N respectively, grow
at the same rate (the ratio M/N being bounded both from
above and away from zero), then all equilibria are within
O(1/M) of the truthful bidding and expected inefﬁciency
of any equilibrium is O(1/M2).
As we will see in Section 5, the trading mechanism we
propose, though not being synchronous, bears some sim-
ilarity with the 0.5-double auction under the assumptions
that the numbers of buyers and sellers are large, bidding
is highly intensive and it develops in a networked environ-
ment. This similarity constitutes an important idea we pur-
sued when deﬁning the mechanism.
4.1. The continuous double auction
The continuous double auction is certainly one of the
most dominant market institutions (it is used in the mar-
kets such as NASDAQ and NYSE). Its deﬁnition is rather
simple, it consists of the following rules [7]:
• Bidding develops in prespeciﬁed periods;
• At any time during a bidding period any buyer (seller)
may submit an offer to buy (sell) a certain good at the
submitted price whereby this offer is observed simul-
taneously by all other buyers and sellers;
1It can be easily veriﬁed that a = b implies m = n. Thus, in this case
all buyers bidding above c trade with all sellers bidding below c.
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• If a buyer’s (seller’s) bid is acceptable to a seller
(buyer) then a trade is executed between them and all
other buyers and sellers get informed about this trade.
Besides these rules, several other rules are common to
the CDAs found in practice. The spread-improvement rule,
as the most widespread one, implies that buy bids (sell asks)
can be submitted only if they are higher (lower) than the
currently highest bid (lowest ask).
As noted above, double auctions are generally very hard
to analyse game-theoretically. The equilibria of the sealed-
bid double auctions cannot be expressed in a closed form
for even small number of players. If we know that with the
CDA time dimension has to be also included then we see
why all results about it are based on simulations and ex-
periments. The most intriguing empirical result regarding
the CDA, that all experiments with human subjects show
([11] presents a seminal work in this area), is that the trad-
ing prices converge very quickly to the price computed as
the intersection point of the true demand and supply curves
(in the literature often referred to as the competitive equi-
librium (CE) price). To be exact, after only several trading
periods the trading prices become very close to this price
and the trading becomes almost fully efﬁcient. Keeping
the above deﬁnition of the CDA in mind the following im-
portant conclusion should be obvious: no central institution
and no global knowledge of the market conditions is needed
to have a market with efﬁcient allocations of the traded re-
sources; they can be achieved by local interactions of the
market participants each of whom possesses only partial
knowledge of the conditions. This assertion is of partic-
ular importance in a P2P environment where, as a design
requirement, such central institutions cannot exist.
In the last decade the CDA became an important sub-
ject of research in artiﬁcial intelligence. In particular, many
models of bidding software agents that can replace human
traders were developed. Among the most prominent ones is
[5] that introduces a simple learning mechanism based on
reinforcement learning and shows that a market consisting
of the agents equiped with this learning mechanism retains
the characteristics of experimental markets studied in [11],
i.e. a fast convergence of the prices towards the equilibrium
price and high efﬁciency. The learning strategy we use in
Section 6.2 to test the quality of our mechanism is essen-
tially a variation of this strategy.
[7] developed a model in which all market participants
follow an intuitive strategy - upon observing the trading his-
tory they form a subjective belief function that gives the
probability that any given bid or ask will be accepted and
then choose one that maximizes their expected gains. It was
shown that the CE price is reached after 5-6 trading periods
only. [6] experimented with a market consisting of both
software agents and human traders. Thus their environment
was not uniform in the sense that different market partici-
pants used different strategies and not all of them were hu-
mans. Their experiments showed that the software agents
achieved larger gains than their human counterparts. They
also observed persistent ”far-from-equilibrium trading”.
5. Open electronic bargaining system (OEBS) -
a P2P suitable trading mechanism
We now turn our attention towards some speciﬁcs of the
double auctioning in P2P environments and deﬁning our
trading mechanism. The idea is to derive the deﬁnition by
outlining some desirable properties that a P2P suitable trad-
ing mechanism should have and possible problems related
to a straightforward implementation of the CDA in a P2P
environment. (We do not discuss here all aspects of the
mechanism and the corresponding bargaining market. See
[13] for a full description.)
Generally speaking, a P2P suitable trading mechanism
must be free of any central authorities (auctioneer in partic-
ular) and it must be possible to scalably distribute it among
the peers. The synchronous mechanisms (call markets) are
highly inappropriate for P2P implementation. The tasks of
collecting bids, forming the apparent demand and supply
curves, computing the trading price and clearing the market
make the job of the auctioneer in the call markets and de-
vising a deception free distributed implementation of these
tasks is not easy, if not impossible. On the other hand, the
auctioneer’s role is much less emphasized in the CDA and,
apart from certain monitoring tasks such as assuring that
offered prices are taken without any further bargaining be-
tween the traders, it can be subdued essentially to collecting
the bids and informing the traders about them.2 Clearly, in a
P2P network this task can be easily implemented simply by
having the bids broadcasted (or multicasted, to be precise)
so that all the interested traders get immediately aware of
them. For this reason the CDA may appear at ﬁrst glance as
a good candidate for implementation in P2P environments.
However, there are certain problems occurring if we try to
straightforwardly transfer the CDA into a P2P environment.
First, all mentioned CDA experiments and simulations
work with centralized versions of the CDA in which all
traders get informed about all relevant events (new shouts,
trades, etc.) at the same time. None of them shows that the
CDA retains its good behavior when different auction par-
ticipants get informed about these events at different time
instants as expected in a networked environment owing to
its inherent latencies. This has to be checked before claim-
ing that the CDA is appropriate for use in a computer net-
work. In particular, this has to be checked in a P2P setting
2We use the notion of auctioneer here as a symbol to denote any aspect
of centralization. It does not really matter whether the mentioned tasks
are realized by one person or by some other means, say, by having all the
traders gathered at one place and shouting their bids and offers.
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with its characteristic distributions of the latencies between
the nodes.
Second, consider the following scenario in which a seller
s broadcasts a price p at time t. Due to different network la-
tencies this information will reach potential buyers at dif-
ferent times. Knowing this and expecting that the seller
s will not make the deal with the very ﬁrst replier, every
buyer with the valuation above p has incentive not to take
the price p but to offer slightly more to the seller s. Even
doing so those buyers’ surpluses can be still positive. On the
other hand, expecting this, the seller is tempted to wait for
a period of time and take the best counteroffer received in
this period instead of taking the ﬁrst one of them. While
this sort of (possibly) degenerate behavior is not present
in the existing CDA implementations due to their inherent
forms of centralization (say, it is eliminated by contractual
agreements between the participants and the auction orga-
nizer which monitors the bidding process and makes sure
that all the participants conform to the rules), it cannot be
ruled out in a P2P implementation of the CDA. Simply,
two neighboring nodes can engage in the described scenario
and their deal cannot be even observed by the rest of the
traders. Whether this behavior is really degenerate or not,
or whether it harms the good properties of the CDA or not,
is an open question and has to be checked by introducing
such a possibility in the mechanism deﬁnition itself.
Third, the perfect continuity of the CDA market (the full
sequentiality of the bid arrivals) cannot be achieved in a
networked environment. To be exact, if the rate at which
the bidders submit their bids (the bidding intensity) and the
network latency are high then the following situation can
be quite common: m buy and n sell bids (m,n > 1) are
submitted within a short time interval; they “meet on the
wire” and the corresponding m buyers and n sellers end up
with identical sets of bids. Then it becomes unclear who
trades with whom and at which price. The original price
setting rule of the CDA does not anticipate this, apparently
conﬂicting, situation. For this reason, we opt to a differ-
ent price setting rule in our mechanism that overcomes this
problem. At the heart of our price setting rule, that is insep-
arable from the rule determining who trades with whom, is
the idea that the market can be cleared by local interactions
of its, possibly self-interested, participants even in the case
of the conﬂict we just mentioned. This can be achieved
if the trading prices are set to the middle points between
matched bids and asks. Then, every buyer has incentive
to trade with the announcer of the lowest sell ask that the
buyer observed. Similarly, any seller would want to trade
with the announcer of the highest observed bid. It is easy
to see that now self-interested (utility maximizing) behavior
of the market participants leads to the highest buy bid be-
ing matched with the lowest sell ask, the second highest buy
bid with the second lowest sell ask and so on, so that market
can be cleared. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The bids are
denoted by the solid lines while the dashed lines denote the
asks. If all the involved traders know this picture then it is
clear that buyer 1 must trade with seller 7 (the price will be
set to x1+x22 ) and buyer 2 with seller 5 (the price is x2+x52 )
while the other traders cannot trade.
High Bids
Low Bids
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
(x1)
(x2)
(x3)
(x4)
(x5)
(x6)
(x7)
Figure 1. A trading scenario example
Thus, this reasoning brings us to the following mecha-
nism deﬁnition.
The Mechanism Deﬁnition Rules:
• Bids can be submitted asynchronously, at any point in
time; there is no time constraint.
• Any observed bid can be replied with a counteroffer
or simply ignored. In the case the counteroffer is ac-
cepted by the bid originator then it is assumed that a
deal is made between two involved parties and that the
trading price is set to the middle point between the two
offered values.
6. OEBS - simulation results
In this section we describe our empirical ﬁndings about
the economic characteristics of our trading mechanism.
More speciﬁcally, we present the preliminary results of our
simulations that show how the two most important param-
eters reﬂecting the economic quality of the mechanism, its
efﬁciency and the trading prices achieved in the resulting
market, behave in a number of settings that approximate the
real world P2P environments. The section is structured in
the following way. The simulation settings and the details
of the simulated environments are described in Section 6.1.
Section 6.2 presents the bidding strategy used by the peers.
The results of the simulations are given in Section 6.3.
6.1. The simulation settings
The core mechanism deﬁnition rules were given in the
previous section. But, to provide a clear picture of what was
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and what was not modelled in the simulations we must fur-
ther clarify our assumptions related to the underlying P2P
environments as well as the ways of applying the rules in
them (the bidding protocol).
First, as far as the underlying P2P network is concerned
the only parameter we consider in these simulations are the
latencies among the peer nodes in the network. To obtain
as realistic latencies as possible we start from the power-
law network topology (generated according to [4]), assign
a latency to any branch in the graph and then calculate the
latencies between any two nodes by applying the all-pairs
shortest path algorithm.3 As a result, we obtain the latency
matrix that is used as the input parameter representing the
network.
The fact that we do not take into consideration any other
parameter of the underlying network, and the TTL (time-
to-live) value in particular, means that any bid, when broad-
casted to the network in Gnutella-like manner, will eventu-
ally reach all other peers interested in receiving it. Whether
this will be the case or not depends also on whether inter-
mediate peers are honest enough to forward the bid or not.
Further, upon a bid reception any receiving peer can reply
with a message containing its own counteroffer, but now,
unlike the bid submission, the offer is sent to the original
bid sender only (its address is available in its bid contain-
ing message). With respect to this, we are assuming that
these replies reach their destinations with certainty and are
not observed by other auction participants.
Finally, our last assumption regarding the bidding proto-
col is that when a reply to a bid arrives at the bid originator
it is up to the originator to accept or reject the counterof-
fer. We are assuming in the simulations that in either cases
an appropriate message is sent back to the reply issuer. (Of
course, it is up to the receiving peer’s strategy to decide
which message will be sent). On the other hand, the reply
issuer is obliged to wait for the answer or the timeout ex-
piration before sending another reply to a bid that it might
receive while waiting or submitting its own bid during this
time period. It is interesting to observe that deviations from
these behaviors present a good example of a situation in
which trust and reputation management can help greatly.
Roughly, the idea is that certain misbehaviors are recorded
by the peers and this information is made available to the
rest of the network so that the future business of the misbe-
having entities is negatively inﬂuenced. We refer again to
[3] and [15], for instance, for realizations of this idea in a
decentralized fashion. However, we do not model trust and
reputation possibilities in our simulations. The exact in-
ﬂuence of concrete P2P trust management solutions on the
mechanism quality will be studied in the future.
3The latency of a branch is taken to be the maximum value of the laten-
cies of its corresponding nodes, which are in turn inversely proportional to
their degrees.
6.2. ZIP-modiﬁed bidding strategy
Common to all our experiments is the bidding strategy
used by the peers. It is a variation of the Zero-Intelligence-
Plus (ZIP) learning strategy introduced in [5] modiﬁed to ﬁt
our trading rules.
[5] considered machine learning techniques that could
allow autonomous software agents to perform in a hu-
man like manner in the context of the CDA. The Zero-
Intelligence-Plus (ZIP) bidding strategy was introduced as
the very minimal learning mechanism needed to achieve
this goal and it was shown that the performance of the soft-
ware agents equiped with this strategy (“ZIP traders”) is
nearly as good as that of the human agents presented in
[11]. As discussed in Section 4.1, this good performance
essentially implies fast discovery of the equilibrium price
and efﬁcient trading.
The main idea of the ZIP strategy is that the traders main-
tain adjustable shout prices (or equivalently, proﬁt margins,
expressed as fractions of their limit prices), that are up-
dated on the basis of observed shouts made by the other
agents and whether these shouts were accepted or not. So
called delta learning is used to compute the adjustment lev-
els. Thus, when a price q(t) is shouted, provided an update
needs to be made (see below), then every trader i updates
his shout price according to the formula:
pi(t + 1) = pi(t) + Γi(t), (1)
where
Γi(t) = γiΓi(t−1)+(1−γi)βi(q(t−1)−pi(t−1)) (2)
Here βi and γi are trader i’s learning rate and momentum
coefﬁcients and, by deﬁnition, Γi(0) = 0. The rationale be-
hind this learning method can be explained as follows. As-
suming that the momentum coefﬁcients γi = 0 and that the
target price q(t) remain constant then it can be easily seen
that pi(t) converges to q(t) at a speed determined by the
learning rate coefﬁcient βi. The meaning of the momentum
coefﬁcients is also very simple. If, for example, the price
was increased in each of several last updates and then the
shout price at time t indicates that a decrease is needed it
might be better not to decrease the price immediately but
rather to decrease the rate of increase. By introducing the
momentum coefﬁcients, that make the entire history of up-
dates matter when computing the new shout price, exactly
this is achieved.
The last important detail of the ZIP strategy is when ex-
actly updates are made. So, let pi(t) and q(t) be the trader
i’s learned value of the price and the shout made at time t.
Assume as well that trader i is a seller. Then, seller i up-
dates its learned price when one of the following three con-
ditions is met (the conditions for the buyers’ updates can be
speciﬁed in like manner):
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• The shout was an offer, it was not accepted, and
pi(t) ≥ q(t). In this case the seller should lower
his shout price. Indeed, provided the momentum co-
efﬁcient γi = 0, we can see from (1) and (2) that
pi(t + 1) ≤ pi(t).
• The shout was accepted (no matter it was a bid or an
ask) and pi(t) ≤ q(t). The seller should now increase
his shout price. This is exactly what (1) and (2) do in
this case (pi(t + 1) ≥ pi(t)).
• The shout was accepted, it was a bid, and pi(t) ≥ q(t).
In this case we have again pi(t + 1) ≤ pi(t).
There are several problems with an eventual straightfor-
ward application of the above learning method to our trad-
ing mechanism. First, because our market is fully decentral-
ized we cannot assume that the previously achieved trading
prices are known to the bidders before they make their own
shouts. Put another way, when a trade is made between a
buyer and a seller we cannot assume that they will commu-
nicate their price to the rest of the bidders. Thus, on observ-
ing a bid the traders must form a belief whether that bid will
be accepted or not and, if they believe that the observed bid
will result in a trade, then they must guess at what price the
trade will be made. To ﬁx these difﬁculties we apply the
following reasoning.
We are assuming that all the traders apply the above de-
scribed technique to learn both buy bids, B(·), and sell asks,
S(·). Precisely, if Bi(t) and Si(t) denote the learned values
of bids and asks for trader i at time t and if this trader ob-
serves a bid Bid(t) (or alternatively, an ask Ask(t)) then he
updates his learned value Bi(t) (or Si(t)) according to the
formulas (1) and (2) with pi() and q(t) replaced with Bi()
andBid(t) (or with Si() andAsk(t)). Now, we assume that
trader i conjectures that the bid (ask) will result in a trade if
its value is higher (lower) than the currently learned value
of the sell asks (buy bids), or formally if Bid(t) > Si(t)
(Ask(t) < Bi(t)), and that the price of the trade will be
qi(t) =
Bid(t)+Si(t)
2 (qi(t) = Ask(t)+Bi(t)2 ).
The assumed trading price qi(t) is then used to update
the learned price and compute pi(t + 1) just as in (1) and
(2) with q(t) replaced by qi(t). This value, pi(t + 1), is
trader i’s conjecture about the price that will be achieved at
time t+1. Therefore, the shout price of trader i at time t+1
becomes Bidi(t+1) = 2pi(t+1)−Si(t+1) if trader i is
a buyer, or Aski(t + 1) = 2pi(t + 1)−Bi(t + 1) if he is a
seller.
As for the question when exactly the speciﬁed updates of
pi() are made, the same rules as those given above for the
case of ZIP traders are used.
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Figure 2. Dependence of the average efﬁ-
ciency loss on the overall number of partic-
ipating traders and the average numbers of
bids they sent
6.3. Results
Figure 2 shows how the average efﬁciency loss, ex-
pressed as the percentage of the totally attainable efﬁciency,
depends on the size of the market and the time spent on bid-
ding. The size of the market is expressed in the number
of participating traders and only symmetric markets (with
equal numbers of buyers and sellers) are represented in this
ﬁgure. The bidding time is expressed as the average num-
ber of bids sent per trader. All the results assume that the
traders were entitled to sell and buy only one unit each and,
as mentioned, that they all use the strategy described in the
previous section.
Let us comment on these results. The very ﬁrst conclu-
sion we can draw by inspecting the ﬁgure is that the mar-
ket is not fully efﬁcient but the efﬁciency loss falls quickly
within 6–7%. We believe that this loss of few percents is a
tolerable price to pay for having a fully decentralized mar-
ket. Also, we have to add here that these numbers are not ﬁ-
nal; they are achieved for a speciﬁc bidding strategy used by
the traders and speciﬁc (ranges of) values of the strategy re-
lated parameters. There might exist alternative strategies or
different parameter values of the current strategy that would
cut down the losses even more.
Another important conclusion is that the market efﬁ-
ciency increases as the number of the participating traders
grows. This is particularly important for P2P environments
as the number of the market participants quite frequently
tends to be very high.
Worth mentioning is also that, in average, the traders
need to submit only several bids in order to realize the
trades. This means that the mechanism and the speciﬁc
strategic behavior shown here incur a short time having to
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be spent on bidding and, consequently, lower transaction
costs for the traders.
Another question that would be interesting to discuss is
what would happen if we had the traders entitled to trade
many units and whether the trading efﬁciency would be-
come better. (This sort of experiment was carried out in [5]
and [11].) We actually experimented with this kind of set-
ting but did not observe any considerable improvement. An
intuitive explanation for this is that the trading bids stabilize
at points far away from the equilibrium price, which, along
with a random determination of the trading pairs caused by
the network latencies makes it impossible to have a conver-
gence of the realized prices towards the equilibrium price
and a long-run improvement as observed in the mentioned
works.
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Figure 3. Average efﬁciency loss for asym-
metric markets
Figure 3 shows the losses in the case of asymmetric mar-
kets (the asymmetry level is given as the fraction of the
buyers in the overall trader population). As can be seen
from the ﬁgure the market retains an acceptable efﬁciency
until the population of the sellers becomes twice the size
of the buyers. For higher asymmetries the mechanism be-
comes unacceptably inefﬁcient when the described strategy
is used.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we explored possibilities for making C2C
marketplaces in P2P environments. We outlined some desir-
able properties that a P2P suitable double auctioning mech-
anism should have and discussed some potential problems
that the straightforward implementation of the continuous
double auction in a P2P setting might have. Based on these
we proposed a new trading machanism that does not bear
similar difﬁculties. The preliminary simulations that we
carried out show that the mechanism retains many good
economic behavior as that of the CDA. However, the set-
ting considered in the simulations only approximate typical
P2P environments and an investigation of the mechanism
performance in a more realistic P2P setting constitutes the
most important part of the future work.
As well, the study of the exact inﬂuence of decentral-
ized trust and reputation management schemes on economic
quality of the mechanism and the entire resulting market is
one of the most important considerations for the future.
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